



Security Privatization: Challenges and Opportunities

The Canadian Consortium on Human Security

Centre of International Relations
University of British Columbia
Liu Institute for Global Issues
6476 N.W. Marine Drive
Vancouver, B.C.
V6T 1Z2, Canada

Phone: +1 604 822-3607
Email: cchs.hq@ubc.ca

www.humansecurity.info

Message from the Editor

The Privatization of Security.....3

Editorials

1. **Benjamin Perrin**, University of British Columbia - *Guns for Hire – With Canadian taxpayer dollars* ..5

2. **Christopher Spearin**, Canadian Forces College - *What Manley Missed: The human security implications of private security in Afghanistan*8

3. **James Cockayne**, International Peace Academy - *After Blackwatergate – How humanitarians can help professionalize the global security industry*12

4. **Sunil Dasgupta**, George Washington University - *The Public Domain Question in Non-State Armed Groups Hiring PMCs*.....15

5. **Doug Brooks and Shawn Lee Rathgeber**, International Peace Operations Association - *The Industry Role in Regulating Private Security Companies*.....18

6. **Deborah Avant**, University of California, Irvine - *NGOs, Corporations and Security Transformation*..21

7. **Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams**, University of Aberystwyth - *Beyond the Privatized Military*.....24

Reports, Analysis and Data27

Human Security Events and Publications32

CCHS Fellowship Profiles

Nevin Aiken34

Elinor Bray-Collins36

Edward Akuffo39

The Privatization of Security

Dear Reader,

This Human Security Bulletin focuses on the trend toward the privatization of security. Functions traditionally performed by state armed forces are now increasingly outsourced to private contractors not only in complex emergencies but also in the context of day-to-day security provision. Their tasks involve a range of operations including logistical, technical, protection and in some cases offensive combat activities.

Peter Singer captured this trend best when he wrote, “Can’t win with ‘em, can’t go to war without ‘em”. Indeed, private security providers have come to be seen as an indelible feature of large-scale military and even humanitarian interventions even as their existence and actions raise a host of ethical and legal concerns. The recent events surrounding Blackwater, the US-based firm operating in Iraq, have drawn attention to an emerging debate amongst scholars, international lawyers, humanitarian practitioners, and industry representatives. This debate revolves around the applicability of the laws of war to the actions of private military corporations (PMCs) particularly in counter-insurgency situations and raised questions on how they should occupy humanitarian space.

Not least, the issue demands attention due to the sheer size of the global private military and security industry which is projected to reach US\$210 billion by 2010 as noted by Benjamin Perrin. Perrin, at the University of British Columbia’s Faculty of Law, cautions that Canada needs to take adequate measures and implement the appropriate safeguards to prevent a Blackwater-style incident from affecting its operations in Afghanistan. He suggests approaches to develop transparency and accountability in the hiring of private military and security contractors.

Christopher Spearin at the Canadian Forces College discusses the human security implications of the privatization of security in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Manley Report. While private security personnel fill a gap in troop contributions from intervening state armed forces, he notes that their actions may undermine the international presence itself.

States are not the only clients of private security providers; nonstate actors work with them as well. Increasingly, humanitarians hire PMCs for their protection in conflict zones. Humanitarian professionals have an important role to play in professionalizing the global security industry, writes James Cockayne from the International Peace Academy. A relatively unexplored aspect of the private security debate is the use of PMCs by nonstate armed groups. Sunil Dasgupta at George Washington University examines the dynamics of the relationship between these two private actors as they compete for public authority. He also discusses the implications for the United Nations of using PMCs for peacekeeping purposes. Members of the private security industry have recognized and are now responding to demands for increased accountability and compliance with existing provisions in international humanitarian law. The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), a

leading standards-based trade association, has led this effort through its continuously evolving Code of Conduct which all member companies must agree to abide by before joining. Doug Brooks and Shawn Lee Rathgeber from the IPOA provide a unique point of view by outlining some of the challenges and opportunities for a stronger industry role in regulating the behaviour of private security providers. In doing so, they list the positive impacts such firms can have in post-conflict settings by employing locals and contributing to long-term stabilization.

From a conceptual standpoint, the increase in the number of private security providers is reflective of a wider transformation in the conceptualization of security and the use of force more generally argues Deborah Avant at the University of California, Irvine. Reinforcing this trend is the remarkable growth in the number of private security companies that provide services in non-military and non-conflict settings. Rita Abrahamsen and Michael Williams at the University of Aberystwyth describe the emergence of new networks of security derived from a confluence of public, private, global and local actors such as those that occupy the security landscape of Cape Town in South Africa. Group4Securicor, the largest private security company today, secures Cape Town through a multi-stakeholder initiative called the Cape Town Central City Improvement District.

In presenting various aspects of the security privatization debate, this issue showcases a range of inter-disciplinary perspectives. We thank the contributors for so generously providing their expert analysis and opinions to this Bulletin and are grateful to Benjamin Perrin for sharing his contacts with us.

A compilation of the most recent reports, analysis and news on security privatization is available in the Resources section. This issue's Human Security Events and Publications list features innovative web resources. We present the profiles of three current CCHS Human Security Fellows – Edward Akuffo, Nevin Aiken and Elinor Bray-Collins – each of whom is undertaking dissertation field research in Ghana, Northern Ireland and Lebanon respectively.

More details on the research and activities of the CCHS Fellows will be available in the next Human Security Bulletin. This final issue in the current phase of activities will showcase select notes from the field as compiled by 2007-08 Human Security Fellows.

We hope you enjoy this issue and welcome your feedback.

Mrinalini Menon

Managing Editor

1. Guns for Hire – With Canadian taxpayer dollars

*Benjamin Perrin**

Canada has been hiring private companies to do jobs that our military would traditionally do – including protecting our Prime Minister when he visits hotspots like Afghanistan. Should we be concerned about this practice?

The United States was forced to confront this issue in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal where contract interrogators were employed. More recently, Congress has been grappling with an incident where the private security firm Blackwater USA allegedly indiscriminately killed and wounded Iraqi civilians in September 2007. For Britain it was the “Arms to Africa” affair where UK-based private military companies allegedly fuelled local armed conflict. And in South Africa, international pressure led to the reigning in of firms with links to apartheid-era mercenaries.

Fortunately, Canada has yet to be singled out for our private military and security company activity. That is, however, surely no reason to wait to address the issue. A starting point is the hiring of these firms by the government.

The Department of Foreign Affairs spent almost \$15 million last year on nearly two dozen private security firms to provide security for Canadian embassies in Nigeria, Pakistan and Haiti. They also do unspecified work in Peru and Greece, on behalf of Canada.

Little is known about the extent to which the Department of National Defence relies on private military and security companies. We know that one company, Saladin Security, provides protective security to dignitaries in Afghanistan, including Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Saladin was allegedly fired by the Red Cross several years ago in Uganda over concerns about links to ex-mercenaries in South Africa. Blackwater USA has provided specialized training in bodyguard and personal protective services for select members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The private military and security industry is projected to reach US\$210 billion by 2010 worldwide. While Canada’s piece of this pie is not significant, it only takes one allegation that a firm hired by our government has indiscriminately wounded or killed civilians in Afghanistan to stir up animosity against our soldiers – putting their important mission in peril.

We need to take a hard look at what roles these private firms are taking on, in order to protect our reputation and interests in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and whether sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure proper conduct. Waiting for something to go awry before taking action is bad policy.

What should we be doing to protect Canadian interests from lapses that might occur with private security forces? To start, the federal government should ensure that its contracts with private military and security firms include key contractual protections, such as the ability to

immediately remove individual contractors that run afoul of rules governing the use of force. A penalty clause could also be included for misconduct.

All private military and security contractors hired by the federal government should be fully vetted. This lesson was hard learned in Iraq by other governments when an investigation revealed that a former British Army soldier who had been jailed for working with Irish terrorists, and a former South African soldier who had admitted to firebombing the houses of more than 60 political activists during the apartheid era, were working for private security contractors in Iraq.

The US government is now requiring enhanced training in human rights and international humanitarian law among contractors deploying with their military. We insist on such training for our own soldiers. Inadequate training in these areas is a serious risk factor, so Canada should require the same of any contractors that it hires.

A further safeguard would ensure that every contractor hired by the Government of Canada abroad is subject to local law in the event that a serious crime is committed. This is vital to provide a sense of discipline and to prevent an “impunity gap” as was seen in Iraq, where private contractors had immunity from prosecution.

In short, Canada needs a transparent and comprehensive policy on hiring private military and security companies. Where such firms are hired, a preliminary list of measures to mitigate the risk of improper conduct could include the following:

1. Preventative approaches:

- a. Obtaining information on the human rights record and past performance of the company;
- b. Well-defined scope of activities covered under the contract;
- c. Clear and appropriate rules of engagement, including rules on carrying and use of firearms;
- d. Require contractors to be subject to and compliant with local laws;
- e. Clauses to remove contractors from duty and terminate contract (with penalties to the contractor) for improper conduct;
- f. Vetting of individual contractors;
- g. Training requirements for contractors in international humanitarian law and human rights; and,
- h. Monitoring and reporting of activities to determine whether these contractual terms and rules of engagement are followed in practice.

2. Reactive approaches:

- a. Investigate alleged misconduct;
- b. Consider suspension or removal of contractor from duty;
- c. Consider contract termination;

- d. Report violations to company, state of operation, state of incorporation of firm, state of nationality of perpetrator; and
- e. Ensure full cooperation with local investigations.

The most reputable private military and security firms in the industry are open to accepting these safeguards. Their clients are not just governments and companies, but also non-governmental organizations. These firms see a competitive advantage in being able to guarantee proper conduct by their employees. For example, UK-based Armor Group is a private security company that has a client list that reads like the “who’s who” of international humanitarian and development agencies. The firm has long been opposed to immunity for its employees.

We should also question whether it would better serve our national interests to build up the capacity of our own Canadian Forces in areas that we have begun hiring contractors to fulfill. Recent polls find Canadians increasingly interested in our country demonstrating principled leadership abroad, and improving capacity within our own military would be consistent with that sentiment.

Renewal of our military to play a positive role globally has grown in recent years and it would be tragic for that to be thwarted by reliance on private firms for core security functions. Taking action to address concerns about private military and security firms would also be an important contribution by Canada to ensure stability in conflict-ridden areas like Afghanistan.

Canadian Military Police providing protective services are trained to uniform standards and subject to our *National Defence Act*. Hired contractors are not. We’ve already learned hard lessons from the Somalia Inquiry about the importance of clear command and control structures.

Surely, we do not need to learn those lessons again.

** Benjamin Perrin is Assistant Professor at the UBC Faculty of Law and is a Faculty Associate at the Liu Institute for Global Issues. His teaching and research interests include domestic and international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and human trafficking. A member of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Professor Perrin holds an Action Canada Fellowship with a focus on foreign policy.*

2. What Manley Missed: The human security implications of private security in Afghanistan

*Christopher Spearin**

Human security is front and centre in the recently released report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. From one standpoint, the report presents counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations directly against Al Qaeda and the Taliban as inherently human security-centric given the *modus operandi* and past practices of these organizations. Similarly, these organizations directly target a nascent Afghan government that aims to, as it develops, better ensure the personal security and prosperity of all Afghans. From another standpoint, the report links the promotion of human security to Afghanistan's government so that in its own right it becomes viewed by the entire populace as legitimate, credible, capable, and uncorrupt. From both these perspectives, as the report makes clear, qualitative and quantitative improvements in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are determinative for the country's future and for Ottawa reducing Canada's military presence.

The report does not cover, however, the substantial presence of private security companies (PSCs). At 28,000 strong, PSC personnel are collectively larger than any troop contributions from the 39 states operating in Afghanistan, save the United States. What is more, how these firms are currently employed, managed, and sourced present significant challenges to the promotion of human security, security sector reform, and central government control. The goal of this article, therefore, is to make plain the impact of PSCs in Afghanistan and to build upon the Manley report by offering some human security-centric recommendations.

Indigenous Impact

Though the PSC industry is often seen as having a "foreign character", as many as 20,000 Afghans work for the estimated 90 firms in-country.ⁱ While these PSC personnel conduct a variety of tasks, protective duties are the most common.ⁱⁱ This covers static protection for compounds and buildings, mobile protection for convoys, and personal protection details for clients ranging from states (Canada included) to international organizations to NGOs. These firms are filling a vacuum because troop contributing countries are stretched thinly across the country as they conduct their counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. In addition, the ANA and the ANP are not yet ready to take on all the necessary security responsibilities. Essentially, these PSCs are meant to assist others who promote human security in that they make the international presence possible. Without international actors, reconstruction, development, and increased governmental control would be severely hampered.

Regardless of these benefits, there may be several negative implications of these private actors, particularly in the context of promoting human security alongside increasing governmental legitimacy and capacity. First, while hiring Afghans may help contribute to the local economy and seemingly keep many militia members occupied and working in a

constructive manner, these individuals have largely bypassed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts. Indeed, the hiring of militia members virtually en masse, with their estimated 44,000 weapons, is described as “expedient” despite government efforts to disarm the various nonstate armed organizations in Afghanistan.ⁱⁱⁱ

Second, the current actions of some of these Afghan personnel serve to undermine the promotion of human security and perhaps the international presence itself. PSC personnel have been linked to acts of intimidation against Afghan civilians and crimes such as bank robbery. Similarly, the International Crisis Group has identified PSC personnel as perpetrators of other crimes such as drug trafficking.^{iv} Due to these transgressions, it is troubling that many Afghans conflate PSCs with intervening military forces while others make no distinction between Afghan PSC personnel and ANA and ANP officers.^v This undercuts the positive efforts of all these actors. Likewise, other Afghans make no temporal distinction between the past activities of militias and PSC work, with the exception that today these individuals have a quasi-legal status which ironically is used to flout the law.^{vi}

Third, the industry’s existence on this scale may serve to compromise the development of the ANA and ANP, organizations upon which the Afghan government is dependent and many capitals, Ottawa included, are placing their hopes. At present, desertion is still a problem in both forces and in the ANP officers are dying at rates 24 times higher than in the ANA, a particularly troubling statistic. These trends are sustained by the attractiveness of private work; remuneration rates in PSCs are at least double those in the public sector. In this vein, NATO officials are concerned that PSCs provide a financial incentive for recently trained Afghan security sector personnel to quit and take up private work.^{vii}

Finally, the bypassing of DDR efforts means that several warlords and other power brokers have been able to maintain access to their fighters because they have negotiated deals with PSCs or become part-owners themselves. In many cases, these individuals are regime insiders working as government ministers, officials, and members of parliament. This corrodes the government’s ability to effectively manage violence and visibly undervalues the embryonic ANA and ANP.

Recommendations

It is unlikely that PSCs can be removed from the Afghan landscape overnight because they are still needed. As the Harper government is currently discovering, negotiating even a marginal augmentation of NATO manpower in Afghanistan is a daunting task. Also, while the Afghan government initiated a crackdown on PSCs in late 2007, it also recognized that removing PSCs was a “long-term process” due to security sector deficiencies and the security needs of international actors in Afghanistan.^{viii} Presented below, therefore, are recommendations so that human security is better promoted, international efforts are more beneficial, and government capacity and legitimacy are further enhanced.

1. Security Sector Pay and Benefits. Efforts should be made to ensure that security sector salaries are both fair in their own right and that pay and benefits, when taken together, are

competitive with what is offered through PSC employment. Additionally, given that security sector remuneration is often not prompt and subject to “skimming” by commanders, better management and control is critical. In this regard, Canada should work with other interested parties to overcome roadblocks encountered by the United Nations’ Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan.

2. Ministry of the Interior. Though the aforementioned crackdown led by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is welcome against rogue firms, it is apparent that some targeted firms have been relatively benign. Instead, recent reports suggest that certain PSCs are targeted either to solicit bribes or to close down firms that are seen as competitors to firms linked to regime insiders.^{ix} International pressure directed to reduce the level of corruption in the MOI is therefore necessary, especially since this ministry would likely be involved in regulating the PSC industry.

3. Regulation. While Canada, amongst other countries, has provided assistance in the development of PSC regulation, no laws have been forthcoming since the process started in 2005. Greater urgency in the finalization of regulation is required to ensure PSCs contribute towards human security and that regime insiders are not involved in the industry.

4. Demobilization and Disarmament. Effective regulation would grant the Afghan government a greater understanding of who works for PSCs and what they are doing. Such information would be helpful in managing the industry’s reduction to a more modest size as the capabilities and capacity of the ANA and ANP increase. With the right incentives and conditions in place, the DDR initiatives many PSC personnel and their warlord masters were initially able to avoid could eventually be implemented.

5. ANA and ANP Training. Given the salience of non-combat roles in many NATO capitals and amongst some Canadian politicians, an increased emphasis (with the appropriate manpower) on security sector training may be possible. Such training would hopefully allow for the ANA and ANP to relieve PSCs of some of their current tasks and become more prominent, effective, and responsible state institutions in the minds of Afghans.

** Christopher Spearin is the Chair of the Department of Security and International Affairs at the Canadian Forces College. His research concerns change in militaries, global security governance, nonstate actors, mercenaries, the privatization of security, and Canadian foreign and defence policy. His work has been published in a variety of forums including Canadian Foreign Policy, Canadian Military Journal, International Peacekeeping, Journal of Conflict Studies, Civil Wars, World Defence Systems, Contemporary Security Policy, International Journal, International Politics, and Parameters.*

ⁱ The remaining employees are either from developed world countries like the United States and the United Kingdom or are “Third Country Nationals” from countries such as Fiji, Nepal, and South Africa.

ⁱⁱ Other tasks include humanitarian demining, security sector reform, and support for elections.

ⁱⁱⁱ Lisa Rimli and Susanne Schmeidl, *Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An exploratory study of Afghanistan and Angola*. Swiss Peace, November 2007, p. 17, p. 21.

- ^{iv} “Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 35, 23 February 2005, p. 8; Anthony Lloyd, “Crime-buster in an Armani suit takes on private armies of Kabul,” *Times*, 31 October 2007, p. 31.
- ^v Rimli and Schmeidl, *Private Security Companies*, p. 28.
- ^{vi} Aunohita Mojumdar, “Nobody guarding Afghanistan's guards,” *Asia Times*, 21 November 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK21Df01.html; “Afghan Article Asks Why Government Tolerates Private Security Companies,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, 7 October 2007.
- ^{vii} Rimli and Schmeidl, *Private Security Companies*, p. 39. For more on the ANP, see “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 138, 30 August 2007; Andrew Wilder, *Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police*. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007.
- ^{viii} “Government Acts After Afghan Media Spotlight Security Firms,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, 24 November 2007.
- ^{ix} Fariba Nawa, “The Gunmen of Kabul,” CorpWatch, 21 December 2007, <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14863>.

3. After Blackwatergate – How humanitarians can help professionalize the global security industry

*James Cockayne**

What can the international humanitarian community learn from the recent scandal surrounding Blackwater? Above all, that while outsourcing security functions may increase staff security in the short term it comes with a range of risks in the long term. Dealing with those risks will require multiple stakeholders in the global security industry to be much more creative in their efforts to professionalize this industry. Humanitarians have an important role to play.

Security is increasingly treated – like textiles, food and other consumer products – as a ‘good’ to be delivered through globalized commercial supply chains. The major clients of this global security industry include governments, extractive industries and humanitarian assistance providers. Humanitarians turn to security companies to provide staff security, training and theater risk analysis in the absence of a reliable supply from governments and in-house expertise.

Before Blackwatergate, many clients may have assumed that outsourcing security functions in humanitarian operations meant avoiding the reputational and strategic risks associated with contractor misconduct. But like stakeholders in other globalized industries, clients of the global security industry are beginning to learn that global supply chains also serve as global risk chains. As the US government has learnt the hard way through Blackwatergate, a client’s own reputation – and ability to work with its intended beneficiaries – may be on the line when contractors they employ kill civilians and damage their property. Similarly, a client’s reputation may be jeopardized when its security providers recruit personnel previously involved in human rights abuse – even if the contractors are working for some other client at the time. Clients see administrative efficiencies, cost savings and access to improved expertise in turning to the global security industry. However, reduced administrative costs means reduced administrative control – and increased vulnerability to reputational risk. Risks flow back along these global supply chains; but as of yet, control and accountability arrangements do not.

With public trust in the industry ebbing rapidly, donors, investors and the general public are increasingly asking hard questions about clients’ lack of control over security contractors. Arguments that humanitarians face increased risks in the field and have few alternatives to security companies will hold little sway until they do more to ensure that security companies provide services that increase public security, rather than jeopardize it.

Yet while humanitarians are exposed to all the same risks as states who are clients of security contractors, humanitarians lack the command and control and criminal accountability mechanisms that states enjoy. Humanitarians also lack the market power that states are beginning to use to change contractor practice and centralize information about contractor selection and performance, with the US leading the way post-Blackwatergate.

As a result, many humanitarians are flying blind, relying on the gut instincts and bar-room talk that passes for ‘background vetting’ of companies amongst many field security managers in selecting contractors. Too often, humanitarians select companies without any sense of industry best practices or any use of humanitarians’ potential collective bargaining power to drive up standards and improve market transparency. This will only change if humanitarians work together or with states -- especially donors – to share information about contractor selection and performance as well as best practices in contracting and control arrangements.

To begin with, all clients of the global security industry need to reach a clearer position on what functions each of them will and will not outsource – and not simply stumble into *ad hoc* arrangements as most of them have to date. The backlash against Blackwater in the US has led to bipartisan calls for limits on security contracting, especially in combat, detention and interrogation tasks – and other functions that might be considered ‘inherently governmental’. The new two-year Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting is mandated specifically to address this question.

Humanitarians face similarly fundamental questions about whether turning to the global security industry increases staff security, or in fact blurs the boundaries of humanitarian space by associating humanitarians with military actors. This blurring of the lines between protected civilians and targetable combatants may in fact increase staff insecurity in the long run.

These are risks that the leaders of humanitarian organizations need to take much more seriously. At present, by leaving security arrangements largely to specialist field security managers, whose mandate is to provide staff security in the short term rather than protect the reputation and responsiveness of the organization in the long-term – humanitarians leave their organizational interests hostage both to fortune and to the soldiers of fortune in the global security industry.

Next, clients of the industry need to consider how to harmonize control arrangements across the industry in order to reduce investor and client uncertainty. In the wake of Blackwatergate, the US Congress has taken steps to ensure US criminal jurisdiction is effectively implemented over contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. But numerous other states are also stakeholders in the industry: as hosts to companies, to their operations and as sources of personnel. Unless these states develop criminal accountability regimes on par with what the US is now putting into place, the industry may simply look for ways to avoid US regulatory jurisdiction. Harmonization of criminal accountability arrangements and coordination of jurisdictional priority and transfer arrangements is clearly needed to avoid regulatory arbitrage.

There is also a need to clarify how existing command and control arrangements extend to security contractors in multinational operating theaters. In other words, who decides whether a humanitarian actor’s security contractors can enter a particular area? Who can remove them from that area? Answers to these questions will determine whether or not, in the near future, humanitarians will be able to access specific beneficiaries.

All of this will require cooperation between states. But humanitarians themselves can also do more directly to improve industry practice. States have begun to move in this direction, through an initiative backed by the Swiss government in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, by identifying good practices for states on contracting, export licensing and hosting security companies. Humanitarian actors could adapt these standards or develop their own, for example, through the important research being done by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Overseas Development Institute, as well as separately by Save the Children UK, on humanitarian practice in working with the industry.

Yet standards will be purely ceremonial without adequate implementation and enforcement. Here, there are huge opportunities for humanitarians – and their donors – to innovate. For example, few humanitarian clients use contractual mechanisms to influence contractor behavior, although they could use contractual penalties and rewards to incentivize good practice in the areas of training, vetting of operatives, rules of engagement, incident reporting, the establishment of complaints mechanisms, labor standards, or the assessment of the social impacts of security companies. Furthermore, few humanitarian clients involve independent third parties in the monitoring of contractor performance, although this is common in some other industries.

Complaints and accountability mechanisms seem particularly important. Their wholesale absence to date has lulled stakeholders in the global security industry into thinking that the costs of security contractor misconduct could be entirely 'externalized'. Blackwatergate has exploded that myth. The UN Working Group on mercenaries has shown some leadership here by establishing a basic complaints mechanism accessible to NGOs, though this remains controversial amongst some states and has limited reach. Encouragingly, [many other researchers and activists](#) are also working on this issue.

In the long run, professionalizing the global security industry will require thinking beyond external accountability mechanisms, toward approaches that instill and reward an ethic of public service within the global security industry and turn it into a 'profession'. It is the different internal motivations and disciplines of national military forces and humanitarians on the one hand (with their ethic of public service) and the global security industry (with its ethic of profit maximization) on the other that ultimately distinguish them most radically. A mixture of internal and external disciplines will be needed to ensure these motivations converge. Without such professionalization, we will have to continue to ask of ourselves whether it is any wonder that individual contractor personnel are sometimes undisciplined given the failure of contractors' clients to discipline the contractors.

** James Cockayne is an Associate at the [International Peace Academy](#) (IPA) in New York, where he is running a study on non-state standards implementation and accountability mechanisms for the global security industry.*

4. The Public Domain Question in Non-State Armed Groups Hiring PMCs

*Sunil Dasgupta**

The use of private military corporations (PMCs) by states is worrisome because it potentially compromises their legitimate monopoly over the use of force. In contrast, the use of PMCs by nonstate armed groups should be a matter of contractual arrangement between two private actors. However, both nonstate armed groups and the PMCs they might hire are aspirants to public authority. The nonstate armed group is often a proto-state and the private military firm acts as a proto-army. Their aspiration to public authority subjects their relationship to well-known problems of political control over armed forces even though they are conducting a private transaction.

Civil-military relations theory applies to the relationship with some differences. Proto-states by definition want to behave like regular ones, but they are thwarted, most of all, by other members of the international system not recognizing them. Non-recognition inhibits the ability of proto-states, for example, to declare war, which in turns determines how openly they can contract out security tasks. However, the essential problem of balancing effectiveness and control—the essence of civil-military relations—remains quite relevant to the relationship.

The applicability of civil-military relations theory increases the more state-like a non-state actor is. Where the non-state group is practically a state, in that it actually controls and governs territory and organizes as a bureaucratic state, civil-military relations problems imitate those of states. However, it is hard to find an example of this. Most nonstate armed groups that control territory do not organize as a bureaucratic state. The Tamils in Northern Sri Lanka and the FARC in southwestern Colombia are practically independent but do not distinguish between the political and military branches of their government. To imagine that they would outsource the core function of security is a tall order. The function of security is even more central to preserving the hierarchy of non-state armed groups than it is for state hierarchies that can depend on other political institutions.

Where the absence of functional specialization on the part of the nonstate armed group retards the outsourcing of security, legal questions keep private military firms incorporated in existing states from working for nonstate principals. The question then becomes: If a private military firm is legally incorporated, how does it enter into a contract with a non-state actor with no legal standing?

There is the possibility of a nonstate armed group hiring a private military firm as part of a “futures” contract. That is, a rebel group might be able to persuade a private military firm to lend it a hand now in return for payments later. These payments could come from tax collection or as a promise of future concessions to natural resources such as mines and oil. However, such futures contracts require international recognition that accords the

nonstate group the legitimacy of a state. Under such a rubric, nonstate groups would essentially become proto-states.

The most glaring example of private military firms working in situations with murky state recognition is the assistance given by the American company, MPRI, to the Bosnian and Croatian forces in 1994 and 1995. In that case, it is worth noting that Croatia and Bosnia were already recognized as independent states, although they were clearly not consolidated. It is also worth noting that MPRI became involved in the region through the direct encouragement of the United States government. The Clinton Administration was looking for a way to rearm the Croats and Bosnians with forces in an effort to balance Serbia's rampant power without overtly violating United Nations resolutions preventing external assistance to any party in the Balkans conflict. The United States became the supra-principal in the MPRI contract: company officials openly admit to helping Croatian and Bosnian forces in service of American foreign policy goals. For the purposes of this discussion, we can argue that in order for a nonstate armed group to use private military services, a state actor must step in as guarantor -- as a principal's principal. Once again, this implies that the nonstate group has the imprimatur of recognition as a state.

One nonstate actor, though not an armed group, which could hire private military firms is the United Nations. Liberal internationalists and PMCs have strongly made the case over the last decade that UN peacekeeping missions should contract out rather than to wait for state members to supply troops in time to prevent conflict. The UN command system is already sufficiently complex enough to impede the military effectiveness of the units deployed under them. To add another layer of complexity might add to the problem. Others argue that privatization would make the system more, not less, accountable. The prospect has not found much traction among UN member states fearful of losing further control over peacekeeping missions. Conceptually, the UN hiring private military firms is another case where member states serve as the supra-principals and works well within the analytical framework described above.

On the other side of the arrangement, the de facto and de jure location of the PMC is important: it has to be out of reach to the state or other nonstate armed group opposing the firm's client. This is an important condition because most nonstate armed groups are not like the Bosnian forces which were well-organized entities backed by states. They are rather localized groups with access to local resources and largely hire local military services. Local military firms are hard to find since the private military industry is really a product of the ability of strong states to incorporate and regulate corporations. But even if these firms were to exist in a developing society, it is hard to see how a nonstate armed group might legally hire the company without violent state sanction.

Apart from the proto-state scenario, therefore, the only other way in which nonstate armed groups could "hire" private military services -- not necessarily incorporated firms -- is through recruitment. However, this kind of "hiring" is subject to political mobilization

theory more than contract theory.¹ Such “hiring” would be no different from a rebellion attracting adherents. This is not a problem of business contracting or institutional contract theory such as civil-military relations.

The problems of political mobilization are entirely different from the problems of privatization of security even though they may occur in similar political settings. How do rebel leaders attract support? Collective action theory suggests the offer of selective incentives with the promise of power and money in the future. In more overtly political thinking of the problem, ideology and grievances play a bigger role. To discuss the possibility of nonstate armed groups hiring private military firms in the context of political mobilization or collective action theories is beside the point. Both sets of literature provide strong theoretical predictions of behavior based on a wide range of independent variables. A nonstate armed group “hires” local private military services by persuading potential recruits of their cause and their potential of victory.

There are two conditions when the putative relationship between nonstate armed groups and private military service providers becomes important -- and both require relaxing the assumptions inherent in the framework. The first is that the nonstate armed group is not really nonstate: indeed, it has to become and behave like a proto-state in order to be able to enter into meaningful contracts with private military firms. The making of a nonstate armed group into a proto-state actor could be the result of internal organization. More often, however, other members of the international community bestow explicit and implicit recognition on the entity. The second condition takes the problem out of the purview of privatization of security literature and lands it in the realm of political mobilization and collective action theories. Here there is no distinction between private military firms, its members, and the general public, who are all equally susceptible to the appeals of rebel leaders to join them in the cause.

** Sunil Dasgupta is Visiting Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University for the 2007-08 academic year. His research examines institutional mechanisms in security issues. He is currently working on military decentralization and paramilitary growth, the nature of alliance politics among small states, and the relationship between US-India relations and military modernization in India. Professor Dasgupta previously taught in Georgetown University's Security Studies Program and was on the research staff at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. He is the author of a number of articles and is working on his first book.*

¹ Studies of political mobilization are vast. I mean political mobilization here as the construction of a movement seeking political goals such as a rebellion. For the classical position for why people join rebellions, see Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); on the formation of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, see Walter Laquer, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books: 1976); on nationalism, see Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966) Civil-military relations problem is essentially an employment contract enforcement issue. See Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (2) [1996]: 149-178.

5. The Industry Role in Regulating Private Security Companies

*Doug Brooks and Shawn Lee Rathgeber**

Private sector support for military and stability operations is not new, but there is clearly greater public interest in these ‘contingency contractors’ now, as well as legitimate interest in ensuring effective regulation particularly for the evolving role of “Private Security Companies” (PSCs). PSCs are a small subset -- five percent -- of contingency contractors but their prominence and significant security role in post-conflict environments make them the focal point for regulation.

Unfortunately, too many proposed regulatory schemes have been based on myths and exaggerations perpetuated by sensationalists, which is why providing legislative bodies with accurate information on PSC operations is essential. The industry has a clear responsibility and the central role in setting industry standards and ensuring self-policing. However, successful regulation must be a partnership including effective governmental oversight and law enforcement combined with educated customers.

Contingency contractors have been around for many years, though their roles and numbers depend entirely on demand. While some journalists and pundits have implied unchecked growth in the industry, the actual number of contractor personnel grows and shrinks depending on demand created by conflicts and disasters. The United States utilized some 700,000 contractors in the Second World War, 80,000 in Vietnam, and more contractors than soldiers during the major Balkan operations in the 1990s. Disasters like the Asian tsunami in 2004, hurricane Katrina and the Pakistani earthquake in 2005 require the same sorts of companies and skills as the peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Haiti and the stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

From a regulatory perspective it is also important to make a significant definitional distinction between Private Military Companies (PMCs) and PSCs, and preserve the term ‘PMC’ only for the specialized firms that willingly engage in offensive operations, such as the no longer operational Executive Outcomes and Sandline International. PSCs are clear their civilian personnel provide only legal defensive and protective services. Unlike the PMC role, private civilian security is as common in stable countries as it is in contingency operations. Although the venue can be challenging, PSCs following applicable laws and rules are actually regulated and controlled similarly to other legal companies.

From a humanitarian perspective, security in peace operations is 90 percent of the problem but only 10 percent of the solution. Security must be in place for NGOs and others to do effective reconstruction and reconciliation. PSCs provide irreplaceable supplements to international or government security forces, freeing up military and police forces to focus on mandate enforcement. For the UN, logistics and support contractors keep blue helmets fed

and supplied, but PSCs are frequently used as well to protect their headquarters, warehouses and staff.

Indeed, PSCs provide far too much capacity and efficiency for humanitarian communities to dismiss them out of hand. Clients and the other key players in contingency operations are demanding more structured controls, although there are in fact strong market incentives for companies to ensure ethical and professional operatives. Therefore, as the value, capacity and role of contingency contractors in peace and stability operations grows so does the necessity of ensuring that we have guidelines and laws for appropriate behavior.

Armed or not, contractors are predominantly locals and always considered civilians under international law. Companies will generally utilize as many locals as they are allowed to under their contracts, and only when they have no choice will they reach out to other nationalities that are inevitably more expensive and require substantial in-theater support. For example, more than 120,000 of the estimated 180,000 contractors supporting the coalition mission in Iraq are Iraqis with even higher proportions of locals to foreign nationals in Afghanistan. The employment of locals simplifies legal questions and provides vast economic and capacity-building benefits to stabilization efforts. This rule of thumb applies to PSCs as well, which means that effective accountability for individual contractors often requires improving -- or reconstructing -- the local legal system.

PSCs are mainly deployed to weak and failed states thereby complicating accountability. Even though the companies are commonly held accountable contractually and legally it is more difficult to ensure just and effective criminal accountability for individual employees. This is a key issue for the future since attracting mature professionals to the business requires confidence in established legal structures. Without some form of legal protection, the only people willing to do security work would be opportunists who may be less constrained by ethical and legal concerns. As a result, PSC clients prefer to see accountability systems in place especially when those clients are governments and NGOs. Even leaving aside the inherent ethical values found in most companies, this client interest is a reason most companies welcome the expansion of existing regulatory frameworks. It also explains the companies' support for proactive roles by trade associations in developing industry standards.

Populations in distressed regions also desire transparency and accountability, not just for contractors but for occupying military forces, peacekeepers and even NGOs. While expatriate contractors working for the US Government in Iraq are under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), one of the real weaknesses of the law has been the opaqueness of the legal process (a bill to address this opaqueness is currently pending in Congress). If locals do not observe effective legal processes underway after negative incidents the resulting resentment can undermine the larger mission. Moreover, there is no reason that PSC personnel should not be held to a higher standard than the peacekeepers and NGOs they serve alongside: companies are paid to provide professionals, not 'bad apples'.

Industry can actually act much faster than policy-makers to address some of the key problems. The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) takes an inclusive approach in designing our standards. IPOA is a standards-based, member led trade association with a Code of Conduct that was originally written by NGOs and human rights lawyers. It is regularly modified and improved upon in consultation with the NGO community and other concerned parties. Prior to joining the association all member companies of IPOA must agree to abide by a Code of Conduct. IPOA also has a Standards Committee which addresses alleged Code violations by working with the private security company to modify its behavior or even recommend their expulsion from the Association. The IPOA complaint system is designed so that *anyone*, whether inside or outside the industry, can bring a complaint against an IPOA member based on the Code of Conduct. The complaint form is available online on the [IPOA web site](#). Nevertheless, while internal industry pressure can do much to modify the behavior of companies, clients can make an even greater difference by making clear to their vendors that they will only contract with companies supporting ethical industry standards.

Unfortunately, despite the increasing role of the private sector in the field, not all contingency contractors are members of IPOA, and too few clients, including those in the NGO community, bother to verify that the PSC they are hiring is a supporter of industry standards. Getting the most vocal critics to support IPOA efforts has been a challenging task but is essential to broaden effectiveness. Industry associations cannot replace effective governmental legal systems but with the support of those most concerned that the industry operates professionally and ethically these associations can take huge steps in the right direction.

** **Doug Brooks** is the founder of the International Peace Operations Association, he is a specialist in African security issues and has written extensively on the regulation and constructive utilization of the private sector for international stabilization, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. Mr. Brooks has testified before Congress, appeared on a range of national and international news programs, and has lectured at numerous universities and colleges. Previously, he has been an Adjunct Faculty member at American University and an Academic Fellow and Research Associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg.*

***Shawn Lee Rathgeber** is a current student of the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. In 2006, he received his undergraduate degree in Political Science with a regional focus on the Middle East. Since then he has concentrated his studies on human security issues as well as the effective and ethical utilization of private security companies in peace and stability operations. While interning with the Scandinavian security and defense provider DynSec Group Inc in 2007, he was tasked with intelligence gathering for operational planning in areas such as Nigeria and Kurdistan. He has a special interest in researching the extremist and fundamentalist mind-set, especially Islamist ideologies.*

6. NGOs, Corporations and Security Transformationⁱ

*Deborah Avant**

Transnational nonstate actors working in parts of the world where the state is weak have become an important part of the increasing trend toward the privatization of security. An increasing security role for these actors may transform the conceptualization of security and the use of force more generally. In particular, there is evidence that international NGOs and transnational corporations think about security and how to achieve it differently than states have traditionally, and these differences have consequences not only for which problems are addressed but for whether and how force is used in the communities where they operate.

The 1990s witnessed a debate on how to define security and its study. At one extreme were traditionalists who argued that security was a fixed concept intimately connected with states and their use of violence.ⁱⁱ At the other, arguments built on the assumption that security was a social construction and thus who was secured and from what depended on the social context.ⁱⁱⁱ In different contexts, security was said to entail economic opportunity, environmental preservation, access to health care and much more. Many claimed that broadening the conception of security could inject new resources, energy and drive into important issue areas as well as potentially redraw relevant political boundaries.^{iv}

What has become known as the Copenhagen School took a position that drew from both sides of this debate. They argued that security was socially constructed, through speech acts. The process of making something a security issue, what they termed “securitization,” however, brought a fixed conception of security in contact with new issue areas. The concept of security, they claimed, “carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape.”^v Once “securitized”, an issue will evoke images of threat, enemies and defense and allocate the state an important role in addressing it. As a result, the politics surrounding the issue will be transformed.

Securitization is at once a theory about the process by which issues move in and out of the security realm and a critique of those who argue for too quick a move to broaden security. The Copenhagen School argued that successful securitization contained threats. By evoking the possibility of violence and implying a “them” against which violence might be employed, securitization portends an instability, intolerance and enmity that renders it a morally questionable strategy for many issues.^{vi} Following this logic, we might expect that if private actors successfully invoke the discourse of security surrounding their issue, it will likely lead to a different politics with less tolerance, more consideration of the use of violence and more enmity between those on different sides of an issue.

Others, however, suggest that an actors’ identity might affect its conceptualization of security.^{vii} While states’ identities have historically revolved around the creation of political communities of “us” and “them”, many nonstate actors have mandates that stand in explicit

contrast to that notion. For different reasons, both NGOs and corporations have specific commitments to “apoliticism”; the fulfillment of their respective mandates requires that they *not* make enemies or take sides.^{viii} One might imagine, then, that this commitment might lead nonstate actors – even those facing violent threats – to think of security and how to generate it in a different way.

The unfolding of debates about security among NGOs and then corporations in the last couple of decades suggests that as nonstate actors wrestled with security issues, they increasingly rejected traditional notions of security. NGOs, particularly, but also some corporations increasingly attempted to transform the language of security and the political processes that surround it rather than allowing a “securitization” of their issue areas. In particular, the efforts of nonstate actors to treat protection from loss as “apolitical”, rather than taking sides, have yielded a more inclusive and process-oriented conception of security that rests on the notion of a security triangle – which is quite different from the absolute divides, enmity and emergency powers associated with state-based security.^{ix} Because of what they see as the limits to their legitimate claims and actions, non-state actors have used the language of security differently in ways that also portend different behavior. Private security companies that want to cater to these actors also increasingly adopt different language and different behavior. For instance, ArmorGroup makes specific reference to its cultural sensitivity in supporting development and reconstruction in post-conflict zones and has reconsidered the use of things like fences and/or barbed wire given its impact on local perceptions.

This suggests potential for the idea of security itself to be transformed where nonstate entities play a larger role as they currently are in Sudan. The privatization of security may not only diffuse control over violence, it may simultaneously encourage appeals to different principles – universal processes to resolve conflicts without the use of violence rather than notions of us and them. This trend can be seen not only in the NGO community, but also (in the wake of NGO pressure) among some transnational corporations. The experience of Shell in Nigeria is a paradigmatic example of this but broader buy-in is suggested by the development of the “Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights”. This is a multi-stakeholder initiative supported by the US and UK governments designed to guide oil and mining companies in maintaining the safety and security of their operations in developing countries while also fostering respect for human rights.^x

** Deborah Avant is Professor of political science and Director of the International Studies Program at the University of California, Irvine. Her research focuses on the privatization of security, civil-military relations, military change, and the politics of controlling violence. Dr. Avant is the author of *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Cornell University Press, 1994), along with numerous journal articles and book chapters. She received her doctorate from the University of California, San Diego.*

-
- ⁱ The following is excerpted from, “NGOs, Corporations and Security Transformation in Africa,” *International Relations* Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007).
- ⁱⁱ Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies,’ *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), 211-40; Richard Betts, ‘Should Strategic Studies Survive,’ *World Politics* Vol. 50, No. 10 (October 1997).
- ⁱⁱⁱ Jessica Tuchman Mathews, ‘Redefining Security,’ *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 68, No. 2 (spring 1989), 162-188; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991). See also review in Roland Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ *International Security* Vol. 26, No. 2 (fall 2001).
- ^{iv} Tuchman Mathews, ‘Redefining Security’.
- ^v Ole Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization,’ in Ronnie Lipschultz, *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 47.
- ^{vi} Weaver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’; Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and J. de Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
- ^{vii} See for example, John Ruggie, ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,’ *World Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January 1983); Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,’ in Peter Katzenstein ed., *Norms and National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For arguments about identity related to actors other than states, see Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
- ^{viii} An organization’s mandate refers to its overall purpose and is often distinguished from its mission, which refers to its reason for operating in a particular situation.
- ^{ix} With acceptance at one corner, protection at another and deterrence at the third, the security triangle attempts to merge classic NGO acceptance strategies with pragmatic steps to protect from loss and the use of leverage – even if only diplomatic – to ensure security. The traditional view of state security is stylized here. Though it may not be a good reflection of security as practiced by states in the current era, it is a longstanding view of the essence of security among states.
- ^{xx} <http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/>. Bennett Freeman, ‘Managing Risk and Building Trust: the Challenge of Implementing the Voluntary Principles on security and Human Rights,’ remarks at *Rules of Engagement: How Business Can Be a Force for Peace* conference, The Hague, 13 November 2002.

7. Beyond the Privatized Military

*Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams**

Despite the wealth of recent discussions of mercenaries and private military companies, one aspect of security privatization has gone almost unnoticed: the phenomenal growth of private security companies providing security services in non-military and non-conflict settings. While less spectacular than the attempt by the British ex-SAS officer Simon Mann and friends to overthrow the government in Equatorial Guinea in 2004 or the involvement in Iraq of private military companies like Erinys and Blackwater, the size, scope and rate of expansion of private security companies (PSCs) dwarf that of private military companies (PMCs).

Today, the global private security market is valued at US\$165 billion. The world's largest private security company, Group4Securicor, operates in over 100 countries, with over 400,000 employees. The second biggest company, Securitas, employs more than 210,000 people in some 30 countries, while Prosegur, a Spanish company, has a significant presence across Europe and Latin America. Companies concentrating on the electronic alarm market, notably ADT and Chubb, have also expanded their global reach. Although no clear distinction can be drawn between these companies and some of the more multi-faceted PMCs, PSCs are predominantly involved in security provision in non-military and non-conflict settings. But while seemingly mundane, the private provision of everyday services such as guarding, electronic alarm systems, patrolling, risk analysis and management has profound impacts on the politics of security. In fact, the growth of PSCs has significantly altered the landscape of security both locally and globally, leading to and reflecting the increasing commodification and politicization of security.

At first glance, the globalization and privatization of security appears as a classic example of the erosion of sovereignty and state power, as the state's monopoly over legitimate violence has long been regarded as a defining characteristic of sovereignty. Any image of a straightforward 'retreat of the state' is, however, too simplistic. To be sure, there has been an increasing fragmentation of the security field, with a multiplicity of different actors -- public and private, global and local -- now involved in the provision of security. But rather than an automatic erosion of state power, the result is the emergence of new networks of security in which the authority of the state and private actors is rearticulated through new technologies of governance, coercion and control. This has numerous political implications in terms of how security is provided, for whom, and by whom, and also theoretically for how we think about the state and global security. Few countries are immune to the impacts of security privatization and globalization but the implications differ in time and space.

Cape Town, one of South Africa's premier tourist destinations, provides a striking example of a security landscape where public and private, global and local actors interact and combine in the provision of public security. The Cape Town Central City Improvement District (CCID) is an initiative of the Cape Town Partnership, a not-for-profit company founded by the City Council and the local business community in November 2000 with the

aim of reversing urban decay and capital flight from central Cape Town. Today, the CCID collects about R15 million (or CAN\$1.86 million) annually from its ratepayers and approximately 50 percent of the budget is allocated to security. As part of this effort, the world's largest private security firm Group4Securicor, trading in Cape Town as Securicor, has been tasked with securing the public spaces of the city. Securicor's CCID security force consists of six patrol vehicles, ten horse-mounted officers and 60 foot patrol officers, providing a 24 hour security presence in the city centre. As a result, the presence of security personnel has increased significantly and Securicor's visibility on the streets far exceeds that of the public police who concentrate their efforts in the poorer areas where crime rates are highest.

But the security arrangements of Cape Town are far from entirely private. Instead, the CCID is a telling example of the shifting boundaries of the public and private, the global and the local in contemporary security provision. The City Council makes up one third of the Cape Town Partnership and Securicor works in close cooperation with the public police. The CCID/Securicor branded patrol vehicles include a City Police officer and are linked to the City Police control room by radio. The supervision of Cape Town's 170 close circuit television cameras is undertaken by Securicor officers in cooperation with the City Police. In addition, Securicor participates in weekly sector community policing forums to identify potential problems, share information and co-ordinate activities with the police.

The security arrangements of the CCID have important implications for who gets secured and how. Those who pay are able to play a powerful role in determining the security agenda with significant implications for access to public space and divides along social lines. While the exact achievements of the CCID in terms of crime reduction are difficult to assess, there is a clear sense that the city is now safer. Some sources claim a 60 percent drop in crime in CCID, particularly in offences such as pick-pocketing, mugging and theft from cars. Urban capital flight has also been reversed. To the extent that the South African state relies upon income from foreign investment and tourism, not to mention the symbolic status of Cape Town as a "world-class" city, the private securing of public space can be seen as crucial.

But for some sections of the population, the altered politics of protection is experienced as an increasing restriction of access to public space, as a combination of public bylaws and private security enforcement serves to prevent the poor and the homeless from utilising the city's public spaces. New restrictions have been passed relating to begging and vagrancy, and street children are regarded as a particular security problem. Although the CCID recognises that the causes of vagrancy and homelessness are social issues and cannot be solved by security measures alone, social services account for only eight percent of CCID's budget. Moreover, the exclusionary aspects of the CCID are hard to dispute.

Lacking the eye-catching cachet of the combat active soldier on foreign territory, the expanded role of global PSCs are nevertheless crucial to an understanding of contemporary security, both locally and globally. Cape Town's CCID may be unusual in its extensive integration of public/private, global/local security actors, but it is not unique. The CCID is the largest of approximately 15 CIDs in and around Cape Town, with similar schemes existing in Durban and Johannesburg and further afield in Toronto and New York. In

numerous other settings, including oil and resource extraction, PSCs play a prominent role alongside public security actors. Such arrangements challenge traditional boundaries between the public and private realms, and local and global structures, and have considerable impacts on the day-to-day provision of security, as well as for broader issues of social stability and state legitimacy. In the CCID, significant authority over domestic territory resides with a global private security company. At the same time, in Cape Town, as almost everywhere else, PSCs have -- to a significant extent -- emerged at the instigation of the state and are part of state-led policies of outsourcing, privatization and public-private partnerships. As such, the growth and globalization of private security, in Cape Town and elsewhere, cannot be understood as a straightforward erosion of state power but rather understood and analysed as part of a broader transformation in global security governance.

** **Dr Rita Abrahamsen** lectures on African and Postcolonial Politics. She holds degrees in Journalism (from Norway) and Development Studies, and was awarded her PhD at the University of Wales, Swansea. She previously worked as a journalist in the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation. She is a council member of the African Studies Association UK, and a member of the editorial working group of [The Review of African Political Economy](#). She is currently working on a major project in collaboration with Professor Michael Williams, entitled [The Globalization of Private Security](#). For further information see:*

***Michael Williams** has research and teaching interests in International Relations theory, security studies, and political theory. His current research focuses on contemporary security studies (including a project on the [globalization of private security](#) with Dr. Rita Abrahamsen), and the evolution and development of Realist and Critical theories of world politics. Recent publications include: [Realism Reconsidered](#) (Oxford University Press 2007), [Culture and Security](#) (Routledge 2007), and [The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations](#) (Cambridge University Press 2005).*



1. Reports

Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity

Human Rights First. 2008.

This report examines patterns of private security contractor operations and the civilian casualties linked to them; the inadequate response of the U.S. government, principally the Department of Justice, to crimes committed by contractors; and the current legal framework governing private security contractors deployed abroad by the United States. Human Rights First concludes that the vigorous enforcement of laws already in force today would provide a solid foundation for prosecuting violent crime involving contractors, but that the federal government needs to provide the necessary resources and properly prioritize law enforcement involving the contractor community in order to end the impunity of private security contractors...[more](#)

Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An exploratory study of Afghanistan and Angola

Rimli, Lisa; Schmeidl, Susanne.

Swisspeace. 2007

The role and effects of private security companies (PSCs) have been discussed from various angles in the past. While much attention was paid to the legal status of PSCs or their potential impacts on the role of the state, little consideration was directed towards the influence of PSC activities on local populations. Only little information is available on how local populations perceive PSCs and what the impact of their activities may be on peoples' every day lives. The goal of this exploratory study is to provide some tentative insights into the perceived positive and negative, direct and indirect impact of PSCs on the local population, in the two cases of Afghanistan and Angola... [more](#)

Private Security in Africa: Manifestation, Challenges and Regulation

Gumedze, Sabelo (Ed). 2007.

Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Monograph Series No 139

Under the auspices of the ISS Project on Regulation of the Private Security Sector in Africa, this monograph represents the current debate around the subject of the private security industry in the form of private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs) operating in Africa. This monograph lays the foundation for another forthcoming ISS monograph...[more](#)



Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry

Singer, Peter. 2003

Cornell University Press

In this book, Singer provides the first account of the military services industry and its broader implications. The privatization of warfare allows startling new capabilities and efficiencies in the ways that war is carried out. At the same time, however, Singer finds that the entrance of the profit motive onto the battlefield raises a series of troubling questions--for democracy, for ethics, for management, for human rights, and for national security... [more](#)

2. Analysis

The Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa

Avant, Deborah. 2007

International Relations, Vol. 21, No. 2, 143-161

Transnational non-state actors interested in maintaining a presence in parts of the world where the state is weak are an important part of the privatization of security that has not been well analyzed. In this article I lay out propositions about how an increasing role for non-state actors in security may transform the conceptualization of security and the use of violence more generally. I argue that... [more](#)

Promoting compliance of private security and military companies with international humanitarian law

Perrin, Benjamin. 2006

Private security and military companies have become a ubiquitous part of modern armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Their diverse clients include governments in the developed and developing world alike, non-state belligerents, international corporations, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, and private individuals. The implications of this proliferation of private security and military companies for international humanitarian law and human rights are only beginning to be appreciated, as potential violations and misconduct by their employees have come to light in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author critically examines the theoretical risks posed by private military and security company activity with respect to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, together with the incentives that these companies have to comply with those norms... [more](#)



Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation

Holmqvist, Caroline. 2005

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

The prominent use made of private security services by the United States during its Iraq campaign, and the way in which this use has become linked with concerns about both human rights abuses and business ethics, has uncovered the tip of what is in fact a very large iceberg of a problem. The services provided by private companies in the security sector today cover an enormous range, far outstripping and arguably making redundant the traditional definition of a ‘mercenary’. They are drawn upon both by ‘weak’ states and by some of the world’s most powerful governments. It is hard to see how this trend towards the ‘privatization of security’ can quickly be blocked or reversed, given the increasing preference for interventionist modes of security action, the growing scale of ambition of ‘peace-building’ efforts, and the lack of both money and men to increase or even maintain the levels of state-owned defence and security forces. Building on the best research available, Caroline Holmqvist in this Policy Paper addresses the challenges posed by the manifold activities of private security services today... [more](#)

Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?

Bures, Oldrich. 2005.

International Peacekeeping

Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, Mar 26, 2008

The paper analyses the perils and benefits of outsourcing UN peacekeeping to private military companies (PMCs). Various PMCs have a proven capacity to perform at least some peacekeeping functions. Although experts have expressed serious doubts whether their capacity to do peacekeeping will always translate into the achievement of peace and security, the author contends that PMC peacekeeping should not be dismissed on ideological or moral grounds when the choice is either a PMC operation or none at all. It is, however, imperative that the perils of using PMCs are addressed before peacekeeping is turned over to the private market. In particular, a set of clear mechanisms of accountability, control and transparency of the PMCs needs to be put in place... [more](#)



3. Data

State of the Peace and Stability Operations Industry: Second Annual Survey 2007

Peace Operations Institute. 2007.

In 2007, IPOA passed on the Survey to the Peace Operations Institute (POI). The Survey was expanded from simply focusing on private security to also focus on the entire private sector, including companies involved in logistics, training, demining and development, among others. The State of the Peace and Stability Operations Industry Survey attempts to provide definitive insight into the industry - its size, activities and areas of operation. It also seeks to provide the general public and policy-makers with a more accurate picture of the industry and a better understanding of its capacities and potential... [more](#)

Directory of Private Military Companies (PMCs):

privatemilitary.org. 2008

“Private Military Companies” or PMCs are on occasions referred to as “Military Firms”, “Military Service Providers” (MSPs), “Privatized Military Firms” (PMFs), “Transnational Security Corporations” (TSCs), and “security contractors”. All of these terms, however, point at the same phenomenon: firms offering security and military-related services that up to the 1980s used to be considered the preserve of the state... [more](#)

Directory of Private Security Companies (PSCs):

privatemilitary.org. 2008

“Private Security Companies” (contractors, firms) or PSCs are on many occasions contracted to render tasks in conflict and post-conflict environments. It is complex to distinguish between PSCs and PMCs when they operate in climates of instability. In this light, the argument can be advanced that in such cases PSCs become localised permutations of the PMC and/or a fast expanding international security industry... [more](#)

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Department of Defense and the Department of State on USG Private Security Contractors

(2008)

The purpose of this MOA is to clearly define the authority and responsibility for the accountability and operations of USG Private Security Contractors (PSCs) in Iraq... [more](#)



4. News

Defense contract crews audited

Flaherty, Anne. The Associated Press. 2008, March 11.

WASHINGTON — The military hires so many private contractors that it should consider forcing them to disclose their financial interests so as to avoid any conflicts of interest, according to a congressional audit. In a report released Monday, the Government Accountability Office found that contractors outnumber Defense Department employees in many offices and perform such sensitive tasks as developing contract details and advising award fees. Yet unlike federal employees, contractors are not bound to most government ethics laws and regulations. Defense officials agreed that tougher standards are probably needed and said they were looking into it... [more](#)

UN Working Group on Use of Mercenaries says unregulated activities by private military security companies is a major cause of concern

United Nations. 2008. March 10

The United Nations Working Group on the use of mercenaries said Monday it is concerned that many private military and security companies at the national, regional and international levels currently operate without effective oversight or accountability. The Working Group, which presented today its report at the seventh session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, notes that a growing number of such companies in conflict-ridden areas, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Colombia, are recruiting former military and policemen from developing countries as “security guards.” However, once they engage in low intensity armed conflict or post-conflict situations, they become in fact “militarily armed private soldiers.”... [more](#)

Iraq: Blackwater staff to face charges

September 23, 2007

The Iraqi government said it will file criminal charges against employees of security firm Blackwater USA who were involved a gun battle in Baghdad in which civilians were killed, an Iraqi Interior Ministry official said Sunday. The Iraqi government has no authority over private security firms contracted by the U.S. government, according to a July report from the Congressional Research Service. Order 17 from the Coalition Provisional Authority appears to shield security contractors from Iraqi laws... [more](#)

Web Resources

1) International Peace Academy Database of Researchers on International Private Security

IPA has been working with governments, international organizations and civil society to improve regulation of the international private military and security industry for over two years. Following more than 6 months of consultations, IPA has produced a database of more than 150 researchers working in this field. It contains details of researchers from around the world writing in many languages, their prior publications, areas of research focus, current work, and contact details.

The database will facilitate the effective regulation of international private security by improving coordination of research, commentary and civil society input into existing and new regulatory processes. Listing in the database is open to all independent researchers from academia and civil society organizations, anywhere in the world, writing in any language... [more](#)

2) Institute for International Law and Justice: Project on Private Military and Security Companies

Private Military Companies play an increasingly significant role in military affairs. Their emergence as important actors in armed conflicts and as security providers in unstable states raises questions about the role of the nation state as the primary military actor. The IILJ Project aims to help develop a normative framework for private military companies' (PMC) operations that will form the context for private engagements in states at risk. A key strategy of the project is... [more](#)

3) The Swiss Initiative on private military and security companies

Switzerland commits, at international level, to ensuring that private military and security companies operating in areas of conflict show greater respect for international law and human rights. The Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have launched an initiative to confirm existing legal obligations of the actors and develop non-binding good practices...[more](#)

Publications

Human Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems

von Tigerstrom, Barbara

The concept of 'human security' has influenced discourse and practice and has been the subject of vigorous debate. Despite its relevance to central questions of international law, human security has until recently received little attention from international lawyers. This book has two related goals: to evaluate human security as a concept that could be used in the analysis of international law, and to determine what insights about a human security approach might be gained by considering it from the perspective of international law...[more](#)

Call for Papers

Third Annual Conference on Human Security, Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkans: The influence of transnational terrorist and criminal organizations on the state and on the society

The conference is scheduled to be held from 2 - 4 October 2008 in Belgrade, Serbia. It will offer researchers a platform to present and discuss project results on the issues of human security, terrorism and organized crime in the Western Balkan region. The working language of the conference will be English and all presentations/papers will be in English. Suggestions received by 31 March 2008 will enjoy priority consideration by a conference-planning group in Lisbon in early April 2008...[more](#)

Conference

Second Human Security and Cities Conference

From March 3-4, 2008, CCHS in conjunction with DFAIT hosted the second Human Security and Cities conference at the Liu Institute for Global Issues. The conference brought together over 40 Canadian and international academics, policy-makers and graduate research award winners to discuss the key themes of the evolving Human Security and Cities agenda. These key themes include: The Failure of Public Security, Endemic Urban Violence, Conflict Resilient Cities and issues of Municipal Governance and Democratization. [Conference vision document.](#)

Nevin Aiken

Nevin Aiken is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia working under the supervision of Dr. Richard Price (Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Centre of International Relations at the Liu Institute for Global Issues). Nevin also currently holds an appointment as a Visiting Research Fellow with the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine where he specializes in research at the intersection of transitional justice, post-conflict peacebuilding, political psychology, and theories of intergroup reconciliation. Additional areas of research interest include constructivist theory in international politics, theories of ethnicity/nationalism, ethnic conflict, genocide, and studies in the normative construction of community. Nevin holds a BA (Honours) in International Relations and Politics and an MA in Political Science from the University of Western Ontario.

Nevin's dissertation work investigates the relationship between processes of post-conflict justice and societal reconciliation in severely divided societies. The last two decades have witnessed a sudden increase in the number of transitional justice institutions – those legal, quasi-legal, or community-based institutions set up to provide accountability for past conflict. This increase is based partly on the assumption that such mechanisms help societies to come to terms with their violent pasts and are therefore a crucial component of post-conflict peacebuilding. However, the ways in which institutions of transitional justice are causally linked to increased reconciliation remain unspecified and under-theorized in current scholarship, as do related understandings of which 'best practices' from existing strategies might be adapted to guide policy in future transitional societies. Nevin's dissertation research seeks to address these gaps.

Drawing on an interdisciplinary synthesis of scholarship from political science, conflict resolution, and social psychology, Nevin's project investigates how institutions of transitional justice can contribute to processes of intergroup reconciliation by acting as sites of critical 'social learning' in the post-conflict environment. In essence, these institutions may provide a crucial social forum in which former enemies are brought together in to condemn past violence and to challenge and potentially transform the entrenched myths, prejudices, and divisions that could otherwise threaten to incite future cycles of violence. More specifically, his work hypothesizes that those institutions most successful in promoting this kind of positive social learning are those which actively facilitate positive intergroup contact and communication, fostering empathy and encouraging more inclusive conceptions of collective identity and moral equality. These factors have all been identified in existing scholarship as necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for intergroup reconciliation and sustainable peace.

With assistance from his Human Security Fellowship, Nevin's research will explore these hypotheses through a comparative examination of the transitional processes in Northern Ireland and South Africa, two deeply divided societies in which relatively 'successful' transitional justice strategies have been used to address past legacies of violence. In addition

to archival research, Nevin will be conducting a series of expert interviews in these countries with select academics, government officials, civil society representatives, and non-governmental community leaders to provide a qualitative measure of the contributions that South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Northern Ireland's uniquely 'piecemeal' transitional justice strategy have made to processes of reconciliation among divided communal groups. Combining theoretical innovation with empirical field research, Nevin's research seeks to map the causal processes by which these two very different institutional approaches have contributed to reconciliation, and explores what successful components of these strategies might be exported to inflect future peacebuilding strategies.

In addition to his 2007–2008 Human Security Fellowship Award, Nevin currently holds a Canada Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. More recently, his research was recognized at the University of California, Irvine by a Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies Graduate Award and a Kugelman Citizen Peacebuilding Fellowship from the Center for Citizen Peacebuilding.

Nevin Aiken can be reached at naiken@uci.edu or ntaiken@interchange.ubc.ca.

Related Publications and Presentations

'Justice in Transition: A Review of *Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law* by Mark A. Drumbl.' *H-Net Human Rights: Humanities and Social Sciences Online*. (Forthcoming)

'Rethinking Transitional Justice: A Framework for Intergroup Reconciliation.' To be presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Convention, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC. June 6th, 2008. (Forthcoming)

'Rehumanizing the Other: Transitional Justice and the Transformation of Moral Community.' To be presented at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality, University of California, Irvine, CA. April 4th, 2008. (Forthcoming)

'Intergroup Reconciliation and the Politics of Identity in Transitional Justice.' To be presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA. March 29th, 2008. (Forthcoming)

'Human Rights, Human Security, and Transitional Justice: Rebuilding a Culture of Human Rights.' Presented at *Improving Humanitarian Action: Comparing Human Rights and Human Security*, Center for Unconventional Security Studies. University of California, Irvine, CA. February 2nd-3rd, 2007.

'Roads to Reconciliation: Truth and Identity Transformation in Transitional Justice.' Presented at the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies. University of California, Irvine, CA. November 30th, 2006.

'Truth, Restoration, and Reconciliation: Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and the Politics of Identity.' Presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Convention. York University, Toronto, ON. June 3rd, 2006.

Elinor Bray-Collins

Elinor Bray-Collins is a PhD student in the department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Her doctoral research explores youth politics in the Middle East. Using Lebanon as her case study, she examines how and why young people are galvanized into communal politics. Her main research questions include: who competes for the political loyalties and energy of youth and how do they do it? Under what conditions are ethnic and religious movements effective at mobilizing youth for their political purposes and why are certain groups more successful than others at doing so? What are the implications of youth mobilization for the politics of divided and developing societies?

Elinor received her BA (Hons) in International Development Studies at Scarborough College of the University of Toronto, and her MA in International Comparative Education from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. Before embarking on her PhD in 2004, she worked with rural development initiatives in Tanzania and Kenya, coordinated youth and agricultural programmes in Thailand and Canada, and partnered with Arab NGOs in Lebanon and Syria to conduct research on civil society politics, women's advocacy, and human rights. Elinor has been the recipient of numerous academic awards and distinctions including the Innovative Research award from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Doctoral fellowship for research in Ethnicity and Democratic Governance, and the Beattie Doctoral Fellowship of the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. Elinor's Publications include "The Politics of Peace Building in Nepal" with Rita Thapa in *Canadian Women's Studies* and "Women's Organizing in Beirut: Dialectics of Unity and Diversity" in *The Lebanon Report*.

Description of CCHS research

Ethnic and religious conflicts are on the rise and pose serious threats to human security in societies of the global south. Crucially, these are societies that are also largely comprised of youth. In the Middle East region alone, estimates put 60% of the population under 25 years of age (World Bank 2006). Moreover, a connection has been made between the so-called "youth bulges" in population pyramids and heightened internal conflict (Beehner 2007). Despite these dramatic statistics, the politics of youth remain "a sorely under researched area" of political science (Hegasay 2006). Youth are described in the literature on ethnic and religious conflicts as "omnipresent" at communal protests (Villalon 1999) and as "supplying religious elites with their most radical recruits" (Robinson 2004) and yet are rarely the focus of scholarly inquiry. If for no other reason than their sheer numbers, understanding the mobilization of youth is critical for the development of theories, policies and practices that promote human security in tandem with efforts to minimize political conflict. Indeed, when we consider our foreign policies towards developing nations – and the Middle East in particular – the question we are in fact asking ourselves is *'what are our policies towards young people?'* Elinor's research fills this gap in scholarship, and in doing so, strives to contribute to effective policy towards human security and the well-being of young people.

Lebanon provides a strong case for this study. Not only is it a country that has suffered from persistent internal communally-based conflict, it is also one where youth have recently been catapulted onto the political stage. In the “Independence Intifada” of 2005 (also known as the “Cedar Revolution”, and “Lebanon’s Spring”), hundreds of thousands of Lebanese youth took to the streets to express their desire for an end to sectarian divisions, external interference, and for a peaceful and reconstructed nation. Indeed, the events of this period galvanized an entire generation into politics. These events, however, present a puzzle: the hundreds of thousands of young people who demanded unity and an end to ethno-religious divisions, were, paradoxically, being organized by the same political forces that perpetuate them. Even at the heart of the Lebanon’s youth-led ‘revolution’ - Beirut’s tent city - the confessional lines were clearly in place. Each group had their own tents, territory, music, food, flags, and of course, youth. As one observer noted, youth desperately wanted to overcome the old political divisions, and yet still “blindly” followed the old political elites (Bayat, 2005).

Three years on, it is an oft-made observation that Lebanon’s Spring has turned to fall. In fact, all evidence points to the deepening of sectarian divisions in the population (Leeders 2007) and youth are no exception. Young people, who called for unity only a short time ago, are being increasingly drawn into confessional parties and activism. How and why have the old communal elites been so successful at galvanizing these young people into political action – even in spite of youth expressing feelings of betrayal by them? What does this young generation of confessional activists – ironically calling for unity - tell us?

To address the research questions outlined above, Elinor is analyzing formal structures and informal sites of youth mobilization in order to understand how they function under various political conditions and within selected political events. She is comparing four selected cases of ethno-religious movements – the Shi’a, Sunni, Christian, and Druze - that represent the major sectarian groups and span the spectrum of Lebanon’s religious communities. For each movement, formal structures (i.e., youth wings of political parties, summer camps, university student groups) as well as informal structures (i.e., peer groups, family and clan networks) are examined to capture a range of activities and types of participation. Interviews are being conducted with a range of youth activists, including youth leaders, formal youth movement members, and non-member youth participants as well as elite adult leaders of the selected movements. Content analysis is also being performed on concrete materials (including, but not limited to, web-available materials, party documents, posters). Finally, these sites and structures of mobilization are being analyzed for how they have historically functioned from the post-war period onward, with an emphasis on the events leading up to and since Lebanon’s “Independence Uprising” or the “Cedar Revolution”.

Elinor can be contacted at ebraycollins@gmail.com.

Selected Publications:

Bray-Collins, Elinor and Rita Thapa. (2002). "Women and Peace Building in Nepal: The Politics of Development Aid." In *Canadian Women's Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2.

Bray-Collins, Elinor. (1997). "*Women's Organizing in Beirut*" in "*Civil Society in Beirut: Dialects of Unity and Diversity*" In The Lebanon Report. No. 3, Fall. 1997. Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies: Beirut. Lebanon.

Bray-Collins, Elinor (2003). "Pushing the Boundaries: The Women's Film Festival in Beirut." *The Daily Star*, Lebanon Edition, June 12, 2003.

Bray-Collins, Elinor. (2003). "Creating or Co-opting Space for Gender Advocacy? National Women's Machineries in the Arab World." Research Report of the Centre for Research Training and Development, Gender Unit, Lebanon.

Edward Akuffo

Edward Akuffo is a doctoral candidate in International Relations with the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta. He holds an MA in International Relations from Brock University and a BA in Political Science from the University of Ghana. Edward's primary advisor is Dr. Tom Keating, a professor of International Relations and an expert in Canadian foreign policy. His second advisor is Dr. Malinda Smith, an Associate professor of Political Science and a specialist in African politics. Dr. Andy Knight, a professor of International Relations and director of the Peace and Post-conflict Studies Certificate, is also part of his supervisory committee.

Edward's Doctoral dissertation is tentatively entitled "Canada's Policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture (AUPSA) and the West Africa Peace and Security Initiative (WAPSI): Towards a Constructivist Analysis and Implications for Policy". In this study, he is seeking to fully investigate the factors that influence Canadian government's human security policy towards AUPSA and WAPSI. He explores the meaning and understanding of human security in the Canadian and African contexts, and examines to what extent African views on human security are integrated into the Canadian government's policy toward AUPSA and WAPSI. To achieve these objectives, Edward is embarking on extensive field research in Accra, and Addis Ababa, where he will interview officials from the Canadian and African governments, NGOs, as well as think tanks.

In using a constructivist approach to international relations as his theoretical framework, Edward's study not only enriches the theoretical literature on Canadian foreign policy, but also provides an understanding of the conception of human security among policy relevant agents. In this respect, his study provides a fuller understanding of the role of human security in Canadian foreign policy while mapping future directions in Canadian government policy towards AUPSA and WAPSI.

In addition to human security, Edward's research interests include conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, international humanitarian law, international organizations, and African politics and development. He taught a third-year course in International Law and International Organisations in the spring of 2005 at Brock University, and has been a teaching and research assistant for political science courses for the past five years. His experience in teaching and research began in Ghana, where he taught high school after graduating from the University of Ghana.

Edward has completed the first phase of his field work in Ottawa. In January 2008, he was awarded a CCHS human security fellowship which will help him complete his second phase of field research at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Accra. Edward is the recipient of numerous awards and honors including a provost doctoral award and a professional development grant from the University of Alberta, a graduate fellowship at Brock University, a Vice-Chancellor's honor for outstanding academic performance at the University of Ghana, and a recognition award for being the 8th best presenter out of 33

presenters at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's Graduate Symposium. He was also the President of the African Students Association in the University of Alberta.

Edward can be reached at ekuffo@ualberta.ca

Publications

- Akuffo, E. A. (2007). *Building Ghana's Local Governance System: An analysis of Canadian Development Assistance*. (Chapter in an edited volume, forthcoming)
- Charles Burton, Kristina Powell, Thomas Kwasi Tiekou with Edward Ansah Akuffo (Fall, 2004). *The African Union's Standby Force: Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy Options*. Canadian Foreign Policy Vol. 11 No. 1

Conference Presentations

- Akuffo, E. A. (2007, October 26-27). *Canada's Policy towards the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture: towards a Constructivist Analysis*. Royal Military College, Kingston Ontario
- Akuffo, E. A. (2007, March 16). *Building Ghana's Local Governance System: An Analysis of Canadian Development Assistance*. University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta
- Akuffo, E. A. (2007, February 1). "Unconventional Weapons of Mass Destruction" and Canadian Human Security Policies in Africa in the Age of Terror. University of Alberta International Week. Edmonton, Alberta
- Akuffo, E. A. (2007, January 26). *The AU Security Regime and Canada's Human Security Policy in Africa: Assessing the (re-) emergence of African Consciousness and Implications for Consolidation*. Middle East and African Studies Graduate Conference. Edmonton, Alberta
- Akuffo, E. A. (2004, November 23). *Foreign Interventionism in African Conflicts*. Brock University Department of Political Science Speaker Series. St. Catharines, Ontario.
- Akuffo, E. A. (2004, February 19). *New Strategy for Africa's Development: Assessing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Canada's Involvement*. Brock University Africa Heritage Month Celebration. St. Catharines, Ontario.