Patronus Analytical
A Thoughtful, Analytical Approach to NGO Security
Vacancy - Security Advisor (ELECT Project) - Afghanistan
03/07/09 09:34 Filed in: Security Jobs
UNDP Afghanistan is looking for a Security Advisor for the ELECT project in Afghanistan. The position closes on 15 July 2009.
Reporting to the Chief of Operations ELECT, the Security Advisor ELECT performs the following duties:
Threat and Risk Assessment:
Go to the UNDP jobs site for more details or to apply for the position.
Reporting to the Chief of Operations ELECT, the Security Advisor ELECT performs the following duties:
Threat and Risk Assessment:
- Conducts threat and risk assessments of operations in the districts and regions where UNDP ELECT staff work and identifies and implements appropriate risk mitigation measures;
- Assists and provides UNDP ELECT specific inputs to the Department of Safety and Security Chief Security Advisor (DSS CSA), while reviewing and updating the country threat and risk assessment.
- Formulation of the Security Plan:
- Formulates a security plan for UNDP ELECT;
- Provides inputs and assisting the CSA establishing, maintaining and updating the country specific security plan and contingency plans in accordance with the UN Field Security Handbook (FSH).
- Advises the Chief Electoral Advisor regarding security;
- Advises the Chief Electoral Advisor, Chief of Operations, Field Operations and programme/project managers, to ensue mainstream security in project planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
- Reviews the impact of security factors (both positive and negative) on the work of UNDP ELECT, and makes appropriate recommendations.
- Security Plan and Minimum Operating Security Standards:
- Works closely with DSS CSA to ensure that UNDP ELECT procedures conform to the UN security framework;
- Ensures that all UNDP ELECT personnel are included in the Security Plan of the respective duty stations, being prepared by the DSS CSA;
- Assists in the development of a functional emergency business continuity plan for ELECT, in accordance with the UN Country Team business continuity plan;
- Takes necessary action to secure security clearances for all UNDP ELECT staff travelling in security phase areas;
- Ensures that UNDP ELECT personnel and equipment are MOSS compliant;
- Ensures that staff members are provided with; and proficient in the use of, safety equipment, including communications equipment, vehicle emergency equipment and personal security safeguards required for work in the field;
- Establishes internal communication systems and ensures UNDP ELECT communications are integrated into the appropriate UN Security Communications System;
- Provides advice on selection and procurement of appropriate equipment for security (vehicles, telecommunications equipment, etc.);
- Provides orientation and training to international and national staff members on security guidelines, communication procedures, travel precautions, emergency procedures and existing restrictions in movement, such as curfews, restricted and dangerous areas;
- Coordinates with DSS CSA 24-hour response to all security related incidents involving UNDP ELECT staff and eligible dependents;
- Liaises, in coordination with the DSS CSA, with local authorities responsible for security, law and order, counterparts in diplomatic missions and municipal/civic/traditional leaders.
- Provides timely and accurate security advice to the Chief Electoral Advisor, Chief of Operations ELECT, UNDP Afghanistan Management, CTA’s, project managers and visiting consultants;
- Reports all security–related incidents involving UNDP ELECT staff and eligible dependents to the Country Security Officer, DRR (O) and CSA;
- Ensures that UNDP ELECT programme staff members are provided with situation reports and other appropriate security related information generated by DSS;
- Maintains updated UNDP ELECT staff lists, including details of visiting missions and consultants;
- Establishes, in coordination with DSS CSA, good relationships, with national law enforcement, military and civil intelligence authorities, counterparts in the Diplomatic Missions and municipal/civic/traditional leaders;
- Encourages an exchange of information relative to risk management for UNDP ELECT programme implementation;
- Conducts investigations, in conjunction with the DSS CSA, in to the death of UNDP ELECT staff/family member/s under suspicious and unclear circumstances;
- Participates in inter-agency security coordination efforts.
- Conducts periodic security assessments of UNDP ELECT premises and equipment and advises on shortfalls in security preparedness with recommended improvements and solutions;
- Assists UNDP ELECT in developing and implementing office security requirements for regional offices and offices of UNDP ELECT-implemented projects;
- Establishes and implements access control mechanisms (visitor/vehicle screening) as necessary for UNDP ELECT regional and project offices based on the security phase;
- Represents UNDP ELECT security interests in any common premises that UNDP ELECT occupies ensuring that staff safety and security are primary considerations;
- Ensures UNDP ELECT premises and international staff residences are MOSS and MORSS compliant;
- Coordinates the establishment of the UN House system in all duty stations and project locations in Afghanistan, from a security point of view;
- Conducts residential security surveys of UN international staff and recommending physical security measures to the staff member (on request provide this assistance to national staff);
- Prepares justification for residential security measures, as required;
- Advises staff on obtaining domestic drivers/servants/assistants
- Leads and manages the ELECT Security section consisting of three international Security Specialists, one international Information Analyst, and the national Security Associate, Security Assistant, Guard supervisor and twenty Guards;
- Undertakes any additional duties, tasks and responsibilities necessary for the successful implementation of the project.
Go to the UNDP jobs site for more details or to apply for the position.
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Vacancy - Security Officers - Afghanistan
03/07/09 08:54 Filed in: Security Jobs
UNDP has two vacancies for security officers in Afghanistan. The positions are Kabul based but there is a possibility of travel to other provinces.
Under the direct supervision of the Security Advisor, the Security Specialist undertakes the following duties:
· Prepares, co-ordinates and manages ongoing security planning for the Afghan In dependent Election Commission (IEC) and ongoing operations in co-operation with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Coalition Force, and the Afghan Ministry for Interior and Ministry of Defense;
· Responsible for the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of all crisis and emergency preparedness measures in support of IEC operations;
· Provides coordination and direction to both host country and international security actors ensuring a seamless integrated IEC security strategy;
· Briefs key leadership on security developments relating to IEC Operations;
· Coordinates the passage of relevant incident based security related information to UNDP Security, UNDSS, and other UN Agencies, Coalition Forces, and to the Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense;
· Provides the Strategy Security Group (SSG) with weekly briefings concerning the overall security environment and its effect on the security of the IEC;
· Provides risk Management solutions to key leadership as required;
· Conducts risk analysis and threat assessments concerning the security situations as it affects the National Assembly;
· Works with the ELECT Chief Electoral Advisor, her deputy and UNDP to further develop the project component for ongoing security advice and support within the ELECT Project;
· Advises on implementing the future phase of ELECT Project;
· Provides day to day supervision of the national security unit comprising the Security Associate, Security Assistant, Guard Supervisor and 20 Guards;
· Overall responsibility for the management of security of all UN Staff in the ELECT Project;
· Coordinates closely with UNDP Chief Field Security Advisor to ensure implementation of all UN/UNDP related security measures for ELECT UN Staff;
· Performs other duties, tasks and responsibilities required for the successful implementation of the project.
Go to the UNDP jobs site for more details or to apply for the position.
Under the direct supervision of the Security Advisor, the Security Specialist undertakes the following duties:
· Prepares, co-ordinates and manages ongoing security planning for the Afghan In dependent Election Commission (IEC) and ongoing operations in co-operation with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Coalition Force, and the Afghan Ministry for Interior and Ministry of Defense;
· Responsible for the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of all crisis and emergency preparedness measures in support of IEC operations;
· Provides coordination and direction to both host country and international security actors ensuring a seamless integrated IEC security strategy;
· Briefs key leadership on security developments relating to IEC Operations;
· Coordinates the passage of relevant incident based security related information to UNDP Security, UNDSS, and other UN Agencies, Coalition Forces, and to the Afghan Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense;
· Provides the Strategy Security Group (SSG) with weekly briefings concerning the overall security environment and its effect on the security of the IEC;
· Provides risk Management solutions to key leadership as required;
· Conducts risk analysis and threat assessments concerning the security situations as it affects the National Assembly;
· Works with the ELECT Chief Electoral Advisor, her deputy and UNDP to further develop the project component for ongoing security advice and support within the ELECT Project;
· Advises on implementing the future phase of ELECT Project;
· Provides day to day supervision of the national security unit comprising the Security Associate, Security Assistant, Guard Supervisor and 20 Guards;
· Overall responsibility for the management of security of all UN Staff in the ELECT Project;
· Coordinates closely with UNDP Chief Field Security Advisor to ensure implementation of all UN/UNDP related security measures for ELECT UN Staff;
· Performs other duties, tasks and responsibilities required for the successful implementation of the project.
Go to the UNDP jobs site for more details or to apply for the position.
Personal Safety and Security Course - UK
01/07/09 13:08 Filed in: News
Armadillo at Large is running a three day personal safety and security course from 27 July to 31 July at Farnham, UK. The course will be followed by two days of either field first aid or communications training.
The course syllabus:
The Security Management Framework
Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability
Situational Awareness
Standard Operating Procedures and Contingency Planning
Incident Reporting
Explosive Remnants of War Training
Hostage Survival Strategies
Guns and Bombs and things that go Bang
Personal Preparation
Safety Management
Travel Risks
Practical Simulations
If you are an aid worker heading off to a conflict zone, or you would like to be, I strongly recommend this course. The Armadillo at Large team has top notch instructors who have extensive first hand field experience garnered from some of the world’s most dangerous hot spots.
If you need more details download the course outline or contact Steve directly at steve@armadilloatlarge.com .
Course outline
The course syllabus:
The Security Management Framework
Risk, Threat, and Vulnerability
Situational Awareness
Standard Operating Procedures and Contingency Planning
Incident Reporting
Explosive Remnants of War Training
Hostage Survival Strategies
Guns and Bombs and things that go Bang
Personal Preparation
Safety Management
Travel Risks
Practical Simulations
If you are an aid worker heading off to a conflict zone, or you would like to be, I strongly recommend this course. The Armadillo at Large team has top notch instructors who have extensive first hand field experience garnered from some of the world’s most dangerous hot spots.
If you need more details download the course outline or contact Steve directly at steve@armadilloatlarge.com .
Course outline
Twitter in Tehran
24/06/09 11:05 Filed in: Humor
For more of Rob Cottingham’s wry Canadian humour check out Noise to Signal. Be sure to check out his blog at Social Signal as well.
Three aid workers killed in Afghan IED attack
24/06/09 10:06 Filed in: Security Incident
On 23 June 2009 three Afghan aid workers with Development and Humanitarian Services for Afghanistan were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Jowzjan province, Afghanistan.
The three aid workers, two engineers and a driver, were returning from a project site in the district of Aqcha (Aqcheh) when their unmarked car was struck by the remotely detonated IED. The massive explosion killed the trio instantly.
The three aid workers, two engineers and a driver, were returning from a project site in the district of Aqcha (Aqcheh) when their unmarked car was struck by the remotely detonated IED. The massive explosion killed the trio instantly.
US aid worker murdered in Mauritania
24/06/09 09:30 Filed in: Security Incident
An American humanitarian aid worker was shot and killed by suspected Al Qaeda militants in the Mauritanian capital Tuesday.
Christopher Lenget, the director of a school for computer science, was getting out of his car in front of the school, when two young men tried to kidnap him. He apparently resisted and was shot in the process.
Christopher Lenget, the director of a school for computer science, was getting out of his car in front of the school, when two young men tried to kidnap him. He apparently resisted and was shot in the process.
Twitter and disinformation in Iran
Over the past week there has been a lot of media coverage of the relationship between Twitter, the hybrid online/mobile communication service, and its impact on post election events in Iran. The argument that Twitter service in Iran is a critical opposition activist tool is already over-hyped so I won’t rehash them here. Rather, I think its worth shedding some light on how Twitter is being used to spread disinformation and who is doing it.
Twitspam has a continually updated list of suspected fake accounts that may have connections with Iranian security. I used some of these account names as a starting point for a quick and dirty analysis of their networks.
Suspected AlJazeera English producer impersonator “AJE_Producer” appears to be trying to lure Twitter users in Iran into communicating with him directly through email or telephone with the intent of entrapping them. The diagram below illustrates how easily the suspected impostor was able to disseminate his requests for contacts. It shows only recent ‘active’ direct connections between AJE_Producer and twenty Twitter users and the recent active connections between those twenty users and their contacts. It does not show retweets nor does it reflect how many people may have simply read a message from AJE_Producer.
AJE_Producer network
Although some of the connections are from people trying to challenge AJE_Producer’s methods there were a surprising number of people who took AJE_Producer at face value including some who actually appeared to be residing in Iran. Given the current level of violence in Iran this is alarming to say the least.
Expanding the network of connections one iteration further gives a somewhat rosier picture. The chart below shows AJE_Producer’s (center of chart) deception being overshadowed by a number of well connected Twitter users (top of chart) who appear to be trying to out AJE_Producer and other fake Iran election Tweeters.
AJE_Producer extended network
Analysing the Twitter networks of other disinformation purveyors from Twitspam’s list highlights some developing tactics. Iransource and iransource45 are likely the same person. The content of the tweet streams is remarkably similar and composed mostly of overt propoganda. These two entities dominate the chart below because they send tweets directly to other Twitter users and reply to queries. Their relatively innocuous names may be an attempt to reassure potential followers. It is interesting to see the cluster of five anti-spammers trying to counter them.
Iranian Twitter disinformation network overview
If we take a closer look at the network on the bottom left we can see a different tactic developing. Ebrahim Ansari (AKA Persian_Guy) uses fake retweets to spread disinformation and confusion. Essentially he is putting his words in the mouths of other users, both real and imagined. The AhmediNej accounts are primarily used to retweet Ebrahim’s content, probably in an attempt to bypass users trying to block obvious proganda. They don’t have a lot of active connections, likely because the account names themselves are so obviously inflammatory.
Close-up view showing AhmedNej and Ebrahim Ansari networks
For the moment it appears that activists in Iran have the edge when it comes to making use of Twitter to get their message out . However the propagandists are trying to close the gap. They hope to trap gullible users, spread disinformation, and create distrust.
If you want to counter them I suggest you go to Twitspam and block the those on the “Obvious Disinfo” list. Certainly you should not retweet anything from these people.
Twitspam has a continually updated list of suspected fake accounts that may have connections with Iranian security. I used some of these account names as a starting point for a quick and dirty analysis of their networks.
Suspected AlJazeera English producer impersonator “AJE_Producer” appears to be trying to lure Twitter users in Iran into communicating with him directly through email or telephone with the intent of entrapping them. The diagram below illustrates how easily the suspected impostor was able to disseminate his requests for contacts. It shows only recent ‘active’ direct connections between AJE_Producer and twenty Twitter users and the recent active connections between those twenty users and their contacts. It does not show retweets nor does it reflect how many people may have simply read a message from AJE_Producer.
AJE_Producer network
Although some of the connections are from people trying to challenge AJE_Producer’s methods there were a surprising number of people who took AJE_Producer at face value including some who actually appeared to be residing in Iran. Given the current level of violence in Iran this is alarming to say the least.
Expanding the network of connections one iteration further gives a somewhat rosier picture. The chart below shows AJE_Producer’s (center of chart) deception being overshadowed by a number of well connected Twitter users (top of chart) who appear to be trying to out AJE_Producer and other fake Iran election Tweeters.
AJE_Producer extended network
Analysing the Twitter networks of other disinformation purveyors from Twitspam’s list highlights some developing tactics. Iransource and iransource45 are likely the same person. The content of the tweet streams is remarkably similar and composed mostly of overt propoganda. These two entities dominate the chart below because they send tweets directly to other Twitter users and reply to queries. Their relatively innocuous names may be an attempt to reassure potential followers. It is interesting to see the cluster of five anti-spammers trying to counter them.
Iranian Twitter disinformation network overview
If we take a closer look at the network on the bottom left we can see a different tactic developing. Ebrahim Ansari (AKA Persian_Guy) uses fake retweets to spread disinformation and confusion. Essentially he is putting his words in the mouths of other users, both real and imagined. The AhmediNej accounts are primarily used to retweet Ebrahim’s content, probably in an attempt to bypass users trying to block obvious proganda. They don’t have a lot of active connections, likely because the account names themselves are so obviously inflammatory.
Close-up view showing AhmedNej and Ebrahim Ansari networks
For the moment it appears that activists in Iran have the edge when it comes to making use of Twitter to get their message out . However the propagandists are trying to close the gap. They hope to trap gullible users, spread disinformation, and create distrust.
If you want to counter them I suggest you go to Twitspam and block the those on the “Obvious Disinfo” list. Certainly you should not retweet anything from these people.
Aid workers killed in Sri Lanka
14/05/09 11:32 Filed in: Security Incident
On 13 May, Red Cross worker Majurin Sivakurunathan was killed in the crossfire alongside his mother according to an ICRC spokeswoman speaking to CNN. On 8 May an unnamed Sri Lankan aid worker with Caritas Australia was killed during a government artillery attack on the “No Fire Zone” in the Vanni region of Sri Lanka. Two more good people wasted in a country that can ill afford it.
Personal note: I find in very hard to write about the self induced disaster in Sri Lanka. The slow, painful, and seemingly inexorable slide from humanitarian situation to humanitarian catastrophe and my part in it eats at me. It’s not like the future wasn’t obvious even two or three years ago. Yet somehow, once again, we have failed to prevent a problem from becoming disaster. As a friend recently put it “it makes me feel dirty and ashamed to have been part of a process that was complicit in this f....g disgrace”.
Tsunami housing destroyed by government artillery fire, 27 July 2007.
Personal note: I find in very hard to write about the self induced disaster in Sri Lanka. The slow, painful, and seemingly inexorable slide from humanitarian situation to humanitarian catastrophe and my part in it eats at me. It’s not like the future wasn’t obvious even two or three years ago. Yet somehow, once again, we have failed to prevent a problem from becoming disaster. As a friend recently put it “it makes me feel dirty and ashamed to have been part of a process that was complicit in this f....g disgrace”.
Tsunami housing destroyed by government artillery fire, 27 July 2007.
Gunmen kill two more aid workers in Somalia
10/04/09 16:40 Filed in: Security Incident
On 10 April, unidentified gunmen murdered two aid workers and their driver in a government controlled near Somalia’s Ethiopian border.
The gunmen killed the head of the Juba Community Care relief group, a colleague, and their driver as they were leaving town in their vehicle.
As with most attacks on aid workers in Somalia no group has claimed responsibility for the incident and the motive is unclear.
The gunmen killed the head of the Juba Community Care relief group, a colleague, and their driver as they were leaving town in their vehicle.
"Unidentified gunmen opened fire on their car as soon as they left for a trip to conduct surveys," Dahir Mohamed, one of their colleagues, said by phone from the region."We don't know who is behind the attack and the gunmen escaped after they killed the men," local elder Hasan Haji Idris said.
As with most attacks on aid workers in Somalia no group has claimed responsibility for the incident and the motive is unclear.
Second ICRC staffer killed by shelling in Sri Lanka
09/04/09 06:34 Filed in: Security Incident
On 8 April, Sinnathurai Kugathasan, a staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was killed by artillery fire in northern Sri Lanka, according to a statement from the committee.
Kugathasan, who had been working for ICRC since 2002 as a water technician, was hit by an artillery shell and killed instantly while fetching water for his family in Ampalavanpokanai, in territory held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He is survived by his wife and three children.
Kugathasan is the third humanitarian worker to be killed by artillery fire in Sri Lanka this year. On 17 March, R. Sabesan of CARE International died from shrapnel wounds. On 4 March ICRC staffer Vadivel Vijayakumar was also killed in an artillery attack in the same area.
Kugathasan, who had been working for ICRC since 2002 as a water technician, was hit by an artillery shell and killed instantly while fetching water for his family in Ampalavanpokanai, in territory held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He is survived by his wife and three children.
Kugathasan is the third humanitarian worker to be killed by artillery fire in Sri Lanka this year. On 17 March, R. Sabesan of CARE International died from shrapnel wounds. On 4 March ICRC staffer Vadivel Vijayakumar was also killed in an artillery attack in the same area.
Four aid workers killed in Pakistan
07/04/09 06:41 Filed in: Security Incident
According to Pakistani television reports four aid workers with USAID funded Rise International were killed by gunmen in the Kund Bangla area of Shinkiary near Mansehra, Pakistan, on 6 April 2009. The gunmen fired upon the agency vehicle killing the three female staff. The body of their driver was found nearby.
The victims of the attack were identified as:
Sadaf Yar Muhammad - social mobiliser
Anjum Zeb - assistant education officer
Naeema Kausar - teacher
Saifullah - driver
According to a Rise International spokesman the four were returning to Mansehra from Kund Bangla when they were attacked. Their team had been in Kund Bangla to encourage local parents to send their children, especially girls, to school.
Although no culprits have been identified by police suspicion falls on Pakistani Taliban associated militants who object to education for girls. Conservative elements in the region object to the rapid pace of social change brought by NGOs and others since the 2005 Kashmir earthquake.
Update: Local sources have indicated that Sadaf Yar Muhammad was the only victim working for Rise International. The other two women worked for the local education board. Local papers are now reporting that the incident may be the result of a domestic violence case.
The victims of the attack were identified as:
Sadaf Yar Muhammad - social mobiliser
Anjum Zeb - assistant education officer
Naeema Kausar - teacher
Saifullah - driver
According to a Rise International spokesman the four were returning to Mansehra from Kund Bangla when they were attacked. Their team had been in Kund Bangla to encourage local parents to send their children, especially girls, to school.
Although no culprits have been identified by police suspicion falls on Pakistani Taliban associated militants who object to education for girls. Conservative elements in the region object to the rapid pace of social change brought by NGOs and others since the 2005 Kashmir earthquake.
Update: Local sources have indicated that Sadaf Yar Muhammad was the only victim working for Rise International. The other two women worked for the local education board. Local papers are now reporting that the incident may be the result of a domestic violence case.
FAR aid worker killed in Sudan
24/03/09 20:02 Filed in: Security Incident
On 23 March, Adam Khatir, a Sudanese aid worker with Fellowship of African Relief, was shot dead by gunmen at his home in Kongo Haraza, Sudan. According to Mark Simmons, FAR’s country director, “He was ambushed on Saturday by men who wanted his Thuraya satellite telephone. They came to his home on Monday evening to take the phone, but it wasn't there. The armed men then opened fire on him."
On 21 February two aid workers with Aide Médicale Internationale were killed when gunmen attacked a public bus near Nyala.
More:
FAR Saddened by Death of Staff Member in Darfur
Sudanese aid worker shot dead in Darfur
On 21 February two aid workers with Aide Médicale Internationale were killed when gunmen attacked a public bus near Nyala.
More:
FAR Saddened by Death of Staff Member in Darfur
Sudanese aid worker shot dead in Darfur
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